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the male and 7-12 for the female], and have relocated this span between the limits of the valid age of consent at common law, [14 for
the male and 12 for the female] and the legal age of consent as set
by statute.
SAMUEL L. BARE,

lI

PARTITION DEED CANNOT CREATE TENANCY
BY ENTIRETIES
A partition deed is an instrument whereby joint tenants' effect
a division of land held in common, alloting to each party his portion
in severalty. For example, where X deeds a tract of land to A and B,
creating a joint tenancy or tenancy in common, or where X devises
a tract to A and B, creating a coparcenary, and subsequently the
parties want to finally determine their separate portions so that each
may hold the fee of a designated tract, they may, if they can agree on
the share of each, 2 achieve this end by partition deeds between themselves.3
When a partition deed between joint tenants joins as grantee the
spouse of the tenant-grantee, the problem arises as to what estate
is created. Normally, a deed whereby husband and wife take as joint
grantees creates a form of concurrent estate, whether it be a tenancy
in common, 4 a joint tenancy, 5 or a tenancy by entireties;6 and in
each instance the marital rights of a spouse without prior interest are
enlarged, 'in the latter two estates to the extent of the right of survivorship.7 But by the almost unanimous weight of authority, no
such enlargement of marital rights is created by a partition deed
joining as graritee a spouse with no prior interest.8
1

A generic term embracing, for the purpose of this comment, joint tenancies,
tenancies in common, and coparcenaries.
2"Whenever persons interested in land as owners and cotenants cannot, by
consent and agreement among themselves, make a division thereof... any one or
more of them may apply for a partition by judicial proceedings-a compulsory
partition,-which takes place without regard to the wishes of one or more of the
owners." 40 Am. Jur. Partition § 27 (942).
8
Michalski v. Kruszewski, 3o Pa. 62, 198 Ad. 673 (1938).
'McCallister v. Folden's Assignee, 11o Ky. 732, 62 S.W. 538 ('9o1).
5
Bassler v. Rewodlinski, iso Wis. 26, iog N.W. o32 (90o6).
526 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife § 66 (194o).

72 American Law of Property §§ 6.1, 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
%E.g., Jelly v. Lamar, 242 Mo. 44, 145 S.W. 799 (1912); Snyder v. Elliot, 171

Mo. 362, 71 S.W. 826 (19o3); Whitsett v. Wamack, 159 Mo. 14, 59 S.W. 961 (1900);
Shull v. Cummings, 174 Mo. App. 569, 161 S.W. 36o (1913); Wood v. Wilder, 222
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The recent North Carolina case of Smith v. Smith O follows this
prevailing view. Benjamin Smith owned a tract of land, and on his
death he left as his heirs at law a widow, Minnie Smith, and two
sons, John and Frank Smith. Frank Smith then conveyed all of his
interest in the tract to his mother, with the result that she and John
Smith held as tenants in common. On September 15, 1949, mutual
deeds were executed between John Smith and his mother: one by
John and his wife, 10 who conveyed a tract (unspecified in the record)
to his mother; the other by Minnie Smith, who conveyed a tract
(also unspecified in the record) to John and his wife, reserving a life
estate to herself. The latter deed recited that it created a tenancy by
the entirety. Nine years later John Smith's ex-wife, who had since remarried, sued for partition of the tract described in the deed from
Minnie Smith, alleging that she and John Smith had held the land as
tenants in common, subject to Minnie's life estate. The trial court
assumed that the mutual deeds were partition deeds and held that as
a result the deed which recited that it created an estate by entireties
did not do so, in that an estate by entireties cannot be created by a
partition deed which names as co-grantee the partition-grantee's
spouse, where the spouse had no prior interest in the land. The court
went on to say that this partition suit was prematurely brought because a portion of the land involved was subject to the life estate of
Minnie Smith.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the case on
two grounds: The trial court erred in treating the mutual deeds as
partition deeds, because there was insufficient evidence to indicate
such an intent by the parties. It also erred in holding that the suit
was prematurely brought, because "the existence of a life estate in
any land shall not be a bar to a sale for partition of the remainder
or reversion thereof ....,
The appellate court, however, concurred with the reasoning of
N.C. 622, 24 S.E.2d 474 (1943); Speas v. Woodhouse, 162 N.C. 66, 77 S.E. oo (1913);
Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N.C. 223, 62 S.E. 91o (19o8); Harrington v. Rawls, 131
N.C. 39, 42 S.E. 461 (19o); Harrison v. Ray, 1O8 N.C. 215, 12 S.E. 993 (1891);
Rhodes v. Peery, 142 Ore. 165, 19 P.2d 418 (1933); Holt v. Holt, 185 Tenn. 1, 202
S.W.2d 65o (1947); Cottrell v. Griffits, io8 Tenn. 191, 65 S.W. 397 (1901); Foster v.
Foster, 153 Va. 636, 151 S.E. 157 (193o); Yancey v. Radford, 86 Va. 638, 10 S.E. 972
(1890).
"248 N.C. 194, 102 S.E.2d 868 (1958).
20In order to terminate the rights of the grantor's spouse, the grantor customarily
has his spouse join with him in the conveyance. See 3 American Law of Property §
12.51 (Casner ed. 1952).
U2 4 8 N.C. 194, 1O2 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1958).
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the trial court with regard to the aforementioned majority rule, notwithstanding the fact that the deed recited an intent to create an
estate by entireties. The court said that "if it should be determined
[at a new trial] the deeds are partition deeds, the petitioner would
derive no title. 'Accordingly, a deed made by one tenant in common
to a cotenant and the latter's spouse in partitioning inherited land or
land held as a tenancy in common, does not create an estate by the
entirety or enlarge the marital rights of the spouse as previously fixed
by law.'"12 Thus the cburt not only follows the majority rule, but
seems to extend it by applying the rule in derogation of the grantor's
intent as expressed in the deed.
In order to understand such a seemingly illogical result, some
inquiry into the reasoning behind the prevailing view is necessary.
By its very nature a partition deed does not really convey, strictly
speaking, but merely operates to sever the unity of possession,1 3 designate boundaries,1 4 and adjust the rights of the interested parties to
the possession; 1 5 it does not create new rights. The grantee does not
take by the partition deed, but has already taken by the prior joint
deed or will. The claimant spouse, unmentioned in the prior instrument, was intended to have no interest by the actual grantor. Therefore, the partition-grantor, who in effect merely releases his claim to a
part, cannot now presume to create a nonexistent interest in the spouse.
As a requisite to the creation of a tenancy by entireties, the parties
must be jointly entitled as well as jointly named in the deed.16 The
intent of the grantor, in order to control, must be consistent with
some rule-of law.' 7 An intent such as that expressed in the Smith case
was reasoned to be in derogation of a rule of law, and hence no larger
an estate was created than had the deed omitted the spouse's name entirely.' 8
An opposing view adopts the concept that a partition deed does
in fact convey, and consequently such a deed should be governed by
22Id.

at 871.

"'Foster v. Foster, 153 Va. 636, 151 S.E. 157 (1930).
"Palmer v. Alexander, 162 Mo. 127, 62 S.W. 691 (19o).
"Harrison v. Ray, 1o8 N.C. 215, 12 S.E. 993 (1891).
"6Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N.C. 223, 62 S.E. 910, 911 (19o8).
27ln re Vandergrift's Estate, 1o5 Pa. Super. 293, 161 Ad. 898 (1932). See also
161 A.L.R. 462 (1946).
"'This riule has been applied even where a decedent's heirs, to effect a partition,
executed deeds to his widow, who simultaneously executed deeds back to each
heir for his share of the land, the deed for a daughter's share, at her direction,
being made to herself and her husband; such husband acquired no title as tenant
by the entirety. Powell v. Powell, 267 Mo. 117, 183 S.W. 625 (1916).
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principles applicable to ordinary conveyances. This view finds expression more in theory than in law, but it is nevertheless advocated
by two early cases.
An 1869 Iowa case 19 adopted this view with regard to a judgment
of partition. The court said that if the estate created would have
been one by entireties, then the fact that it arose out of a partition
proceeding would not preclude this result.2 0 The same view was
followed by New York in Wright v. Sadler,21 wherein a partition deed
naming as grantee a coparcencer and spouse was held to create a tenancy by entireties. 22 The New York court used the persuasive argument that if a simple partition, wherein a spouse with no prior interest would gain only dower or curtesy rights, was intended, then that
end was attainable by naming the coparcener alone as grantee. But
where the grant was in express terms to both spouses, the court found
that something more was intended: that is, the vesting of a concur2
rent estate in the coparcener's wife. '
However persuasive this argument may seem, it is said to pale in
the light of the true nature of a partition proceeding.2 4 The partitiongrantee already has what the deed "conveys"; the deed merely describes it. A named grantee with no prior interest could no more
take as a tenant by entirety than could a new bride claim an estate
by entirety in land owned by her husband for ten years prior to the
marriage. The husband took under the conveyance ten years ago; the
partition-grantee took under a conveyance some time before the parties
decided to partition-a conveyance from which the spouse's name was
absent.
There appears to be a third view, which, if it does not frontally
attack the majority view, at least casts considerable doubt on the
soundness of the Smith decision. This view facilitates the creation of
an estate by entireties and is harmonious with the current trend toward streamlining the law and overlooking technicalities which contradict a clearly expressed and lawful intent. This trend finds ample
"°Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 02 (1869).
n2a8 Iowa 302, 304 (1869). The case is distinguishable, however, in that both
spouses had a prior interest, and is valuable only for its implication that a partition
deed is equivalent to an ordinary conveyance.
m2o N.Y. 320 (1859).

-One spouse, however, was an alien who failed to file a deposition required
by statute alleging his intent to become a United States citizen. The court held that
on the death of his spouse, the estate vested in him nevertheless, subject to the right
of escheat in the state.
21o N.Y. 320, 323 (1859).
2ISee note 8 supra.
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expression in situations where one party owns land and wishes to
confer on his spouse the right of survivorship through a tenancy by
entireties. The most orthodox method for achieving this end has
been for the grantor to convey to a third person, who in turn reconveys the land to the 4usband and wife as joint grantees. 25 The
courts do not hesitate to indulge in this obvious fiction, in order to
carry out the parties' intent. Some jurisdictions go further and allow
a party to convey to himself and his spouse in a joint deed, thereby
creating an estate by entireties.26 These courts rationalize the maxim
that one cannot convey to himself, by declaring that the spouse
merely conveyed "to a legal unity or entity which was the consolidation of himself and another." 27 Other jurisdictions go still further
in streamlining this phase of the law by allowing the creation of
estates by entirety by one spouse's conveyance of a one-half undivided
interest in his land to the other, where his intent is clear,28 or simply
by allowing one spouse to convey the whole to the other, where the
intent is likewise clear.29 Such drastic departures from the common
law are justifiable; they are pursuant to a just and legitimate
end.3 0
There is no reason why this view should not be applied to partition
deeds, a fortiori to partition deeds which express an intent to create
estates by entirety. When one considers the scope and purpose of
reform doctrines which abolish needless technicalities, the injustice of
the Smith case becomes manifest. Minnie Smith intended to create
a tenancy by the entireties in her son and his wife; her intent was
both pateht and lawful. The estate, however, was never vested in
the spouses. The reason was that a sweeping proposition of law-one
"Davis v. Cla;k, 26 Ind.424 (1866); Taul v. Campbell, 7 Yerg. 319 (Tenn. 1835);
Kratovil, Real Estate Law § 445 (1946); 26 Cornell L.Q. 508 (1941).
wBoehringer v. Schmid, 254 N.Y. 355, 173 N.E. 22o (195o); Coon v. Campbell,
138 Misc. 567, 24o N.Y. Supp. 772 (Sup. Ct. 193o); In re Vogesang's Estate, 122
Misc. 599, 2o3 N.Y. Supp. 364 (Surr. Ct. 1924); Dutton v. Buckley, 116 Ore. 661,
242 Pac. 626 (1926); In re Vandergrift's Estate, io5 Pa. Super. 293, 161 Atl. 898 (1932).
But see Stone v. Culver, 286 Mich. 263, 282 N.W. 142 (1938); Wright v. Knapp, 183
Mich. 656, 15o N.W. 315 (1915); Pegg v. Pegg, 165 Mich. 228, 13o N.W. 617 (1911).
'In re Klatzl's Estate, 216 N.Y. 83, 11o N.E. 181, 185 (1915) (dissenting opinion).
The dissent in this case actually represents the majority view regarding the ability of
the husband to create a tenancy by the entirety by conveying to himself and his
wife. It has since been adopted as the law in New York. See In re Lyon's Estate,
233 N.Y. 2o8, 135 N.E. 247 (1922). See also the New York cases cited in note 26
supra.
28Runions v. Runions, 186 Tenn. 25, io7 S.W.2d i16 (1948). See 21 Tenn, L. Rev.
•
339 (195o)
=1 Fla. L. Rev. 433 (1948)-2 Tiffany, Real Property § 432 (3d ed. 1939).

